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Abstract 
This paper explores the heterogeneity and rationality of professional forecasts at both short 
and long forecast horizons. We employ disaggregated survey data for forecasts of three-
month inter-bank rates and ten-year gilt yields for the period 1989-2006. We find evidence 
of heterogeneity among forecasters. Moreover, forecasts violate both the unbiasedness and 
orthogonality conditions of the rational expectations hypothesis. The majority of biased 
forecasts underestimate the future spot rate. The rationality of forecasts varies across 
maturities and forecast horizons with short horizon and short maturity forecasts exhibiting 
more rationality. It also varies across sub-periods corresponding to different monetary 
policy frameworks. We produce evidence indicating that both monetary policy actions and 
elements of communication policy have information content regarding the rationality of 
forecasts. Changes in official bank rates and disagreement, as recorded in the minutes of the 
Monetary Policy Committee, influence the rationality of forecasts.  The publication of 
inflation reports has no effect. 
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1. Introduction 
The typical assumption permeating financial economics is that market participants 
form their expectations rationally.1 Indeed, this assumption is founded on solid 
theoretical considerations and a powerful rationale. Nevertheless, the rationality 
hypothesis has been challenged both on theoretical grounds (e.g., the cognitive 
psychology literature that underpins behavioural finance and behavioural economics) 
and in terms of its empirical validity (see surveys by Frankel and Froot, 1987; Ito, 
1990; Camerer et al., 2004; Thaler, 1993, 2005). One approach for empirically testing 
the validity of the assumption of rationality relies on using survey data as a proxy for 
market expectations. The bulk of such studies have been applied mainly to exchange 
rates2 with fewer applications to interest rates and stock prices.  
Most existing survey-based studies test the rational expectations hypothesis 
(REH) with reference to an aggregate prediction, usually a consensus forecast as 
measured either by the mean or median forecast.3 This approach, however, has a 
number of weaknesses. As Bonham and Cohen (2001) demonstrate, unless individual 
forecasters are homogeneous, the use of a consensus measure introduces an 
aggregation bias that conceals the heterogeneous behaviour of forecasters and can 
result in misleading inferences when testing the REH. Therefore a heterogeneity test 
constitutes a crucial pre-test to indicate whether the rationality test should use 
consensus or individual forecasts. Existing evidence relating to the heterogeneity of 
expectations is restricted to a small number of studies using foreign exchange rate 
data (Ito, 1990; MacDonald and Marsh, 1996; Elliott and Ito, 1999; and Bonham et al, 
2006). To our knowledge, the current study is the first attempt to test for 
heterogeneity of interest rate expectations. 
Previous studies focusing on interest rates have applied a bivariate regression to 
test the REH. Holden and Peel (1990), however, demonstrate that the joint hypothesis 
                                                 
1
For example, several studies test the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest under the 
REH assumption (see Mills, 1991; Hurn et al.,1995; Cuthbertson , 1996; Cuthbertson et al., 1996 for 
the studies of the UK data) 
2 Tests of rationality in foreign exchange markets have been conducted by Dominguez (1986), Frankel 
and Froot (1987), Taylor (1989), Ito (1990), MacDonald (1990), Cavaglia et al. (1993, 1994), Chinn 
and Frankel (1994), MacDonald and Marsh (1996), Kim (1997), Elliott and Ito (1999), Verschoor and 
Wolff (2001) and Bonham et al. (2006). 
3 Of the REH studies relating to interest rates, Froot (1989), Batchelor (1991), MacDonald and 
MacMillan (1996), Kim (1997) and Jongen and Verschoor (2007) use a consensus measure.  Only 
MacDonald and MacMillan (1994) use a panel of forecasts. 
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from a bivariate regression provides a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for 
unbiasedness, thereby resulting in the over-rejection of the null hypothesis of 
unbiasedness. For this reason we use a univariate test of biasedness since it tests for 
both necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The ability of forecasters to minimize systematic mistakes depends in part on the 
available information and the costs of processing it. In recent years there has been an 
increasing awareness amongst both academics and policymakers of the importance of 
managing expectations.  This has led central banks to increase the transparency and 
openness of their policy decisions with the implicit objective to raise the signal-to-
noise ratio of policy decisions (Blinder 2004; Blinder et al. 2008).  We consider 
explicitly the role of alternative monetary policy frameworks on the pervasiveness of 
interest rate forecast rationality. During the period under consideration the UK 
experienced three distinct monetary policy regimes along with the introduction and 
refinement of new channels of communication. For example, the MPC framework 
adopted in 1997 established the quarterly inflation report and the practice of 
publishing MPC minutes, thereby enhancing the transparency of UK monetary policy 
and giving rise to a more open central bank communication policy.  
In summary, our work contributes to the limited literature on the heterogeneity 
and rationality of interest rate forecasts in at least four important ways. First, we 
consider a relatively lengthy sample period that allows us to account for differences in 
the monetary policy framework and test whether the institutional design of monetary 
policy has affected the performance of forecasters.  Second, we conduct tests of 
rationality for both short and long maturities at both short and long forecast horizons, 
accounting for the possibility that forecasters may form their expectations differently 
depending on the maturity of interest rates and the length of the forecast horizon. 
Third, to our knowledge this paper is the first to apply a test of heterogeneity as a pre-
test of the REH for interest rate forecasts and also the first to test the REH of interest 
rate forecasts by using the univariate specification for which both necessary and 
sufficient conditions are tested. Finally, we test both the unbiasedness and 
orthogonality conditions of the REH using a variety of information sets for the latter 
test. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 presents the 
analytical framework and methodology and section 3 gives a description of the data 
set. Section 4 reports the empirical results of heterogeneity and rationality of 
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forecasts. Section 5 investigates the rationality of forecasts under different 
institutional frameworks of monetary policy. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the 
results. 
 
2. Analytical framework and methodology 
As defined by Muth (1961), the REH assumes that market participants know the true 
economic model that generates the possible outcomes. Expectations are rational if the 
unbiasedness and orthogonality conditions are satisfied. The unbiasedness condition 
postulates that expectations errors have an unconditional mean equal to zero, implying 
that there is no systematic error. The orthogonality condition requires that 
expectations errors conditioned on the publicly available information set have a zero 
mean, implying that expectations are informationally efficient. 
When using survey data to test the unbiasedness condition of the REH most 
researchers employ a consensus measure of the forecasts, such as the mean or median, 
to proxy the actual market’s expectations. Moreover, it is conventional to test the 
unbiasedness condition of rationality by means of a bivariate regression in which the 
actual change in spot rate is regressed on the expected spot rate change as below, 
(  - )  = ktr + tr kα  + kβ (  - ) + sktr , tr kt ,μ    (1) 
where  and  are the spot rate at time t and t+k respectively,  is the consensus 
forecast for the spot rate made at time t  for k periods ahead, and 
tr ktr +
s
ktr ,
kt ,μ  is the 
disturbance term.  However, Holden and Peel (1990) and Bonham et al. (2006) 
demonstrate that the joint null hypothesis ( kα =0, kβ =1) is a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition for unbiasedness. This implies that the bivariate regression is 
likely to over-reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness. Therefore, the univariate 
regression specified in equation (2) emerges as an alternative testing framework. The 
null hypothesis of unbiasedness is that kα  is not statistically different from zero, and 
constitutes both a necessary and sufficient condition for unbiasedness. 
(  - )  = ktr +
s
ktr , kα  + kt ,μ      (2) 
In addition to testing for unbiasedness, the orthogonality condition can be tested 
by regressing the consensus expectations error against any publicly available 
information set as shown in equation (3). 
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(  - )  = ktr +
s
ktr , kα  + tk Xβ  + kt ,μ    (3) 
where  is an information set available at time t . For example, MacDonald and 
MacMillan (1994) use the forward premium. In the current study we use the forward 
premium along with the lagged spot rate changes and the past expectations errors as 
information sets. 
tX
The null hypothesis of the orthogonality test is that both kα   and kβ  are jointly 
equal to zero, implying that if forecasters efficiently utilize information publicly 
available at the time of forecasting any components from that information set should 
be unrelated or orthogonal to the expectations errors. 
In early tests of the REH, it was common practice to assume a representative 
agent by applying tests of rationality to a consensus measure of individual forecasts, 
as shown in equation (1) to (3).  Alternatively, individual forecasts are pooled in order 
to increase the degrees of freedom.4 However, Bonham and Cohen (2001) argue that 
heterogeneity among forecasters is a source of bias in both the consensus and pooled 
specifications. In the presence of heterogeneous forecasts, the REH should be 
separately tested for each individual forecaster. Therefore, a test of heterogeneity is a 
crucial pre-test to indicate whether the REH test should be conducted by consensus 
regressions, individual regressions or pooling over individual regressions. 
In view of the concerns expressed by Bonham and Cohen we apply the 
heterogeneity test proposed by Ito (1990). This test has been used by MacDonald and 
Marsh (1996), Elliott and Ito (1999) and Bonham et al. (2006), among others. The 
simple form of Ito’s heterogeneity test is presented in equation (4) 
ktiki
s
kt
e
kti rr ,,,,,, )( μα +=−     (4) 
where  is forecaster  prediction for the spot rate made at time t  for k periods 
ahead,  is the consensus or mean forecast for the same spot rate, 
e
ktir ,, si'
s
ktr , ki ,α  is the 
individual effect (see Ito, 1990) and kti ,,μ  is the disturbance term. A significant 
individual coefficient indicates forecaster i systematically deviates from the consensus 
forecast and suggests heterogeneity among forecasters.   
                                                 
4 Figlewski and Wachtel (1983), MacDonald (1992), Bonham and Cohen (2001) and Bonham et al. 
(2006) argue that private information exists in the current consensus forecast and that the use of 
consensus forecasts to test rationality is invalid. Moreover, Keane and Runkle (1990) show that the 
consensus measure across forecasters may aggregate out individuals’ biases leading to the acceptance 
of the REH despite individual forecasters being irrational. 
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Although individual forecasters have common information sets, they may react 
differently to certain elements in the common information set.5 The idiosyncratic 
coefficient ( ki ,β ) in equation (5) represents the different reactions to certain parts of 
the common information set, 
ktitkiki
s
kt
e
kti Xrr ,,,,,,, )( μβα ++=−    (5) 
where  is a common information set, while tX ki ,α  and  ki ,β  correspond to the 
individual and idiosyncratic effects respectively. We use the forward premium, the 
lagged spot rate change and the lagged consensus forecast error as the common 
information set. This extended version of Ito’s heterogeneity test as shown in equation 
(5) can be viewed as the orthogonality test of individual forecaster errors relative to 
the consensus forecast with respect to a common information set. If both individual 
and idiosyncratic effects are jointly significantly different from zero it is indicative of 
heterogeneity among forecasts. 
As mentioned above, if there is convincing evidence of heterogeneity among 
individual forecasts, the rationality tests should be based on regressions for each 
individual forecast rather than the consensus forecast. Thus, the consensus forecast in 
equation (2) and (3) should be replaced by the individual forecasts. To test the 
unbiasedness and orthogonality conditions when heterogeneity exists among forecasts 
we use the following two specifications: 
(  - )  = ktr +
e
ktir ,, ki ,α  + kti ,,μ      (6) 
 (  - )  = ktr +
e
ktir ,, ki ,α  + tki X,β  + kti ,,μ   (7) 
                                                
Of course, the rational expectations assumption does not suggest that forecasts are 
always accurate but rather that forecasters do not make systematic mistakes. The 
ability to avoid making systematic mistakes depends on the available information and 
the costs of processing it. Accordingly, we take the analysis one step further to 
consider whether the monetary policy environment has affected the prevalence of 
rationality in interest rates forecasts.   
A number of studies consider interest rate forecast rationality in relation to 
monetary policy. Pesando (1981) examines three sets of Canadian interest rates 
forecasts and finds results consistent with the efficient market approach. Friedman 
(1980), on the other hand, finds evidence contrary to rationality for interest rate 
 
5 For example, see Ito (1990), MacDonald and Marsh (1996), and Elliott and Ito (1999). 
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forecasts with 3 months and 6 months horizons. His findings show that survey 
respondents are not unbiased (especially for the longer horizon) and they do not 
efficiently exploit all the information contained in past interest rate movement or 
other macroeconomic variables, with the exception of the money stock. Simon (1989) 
finds that federal funds rate expectations (from March 1984 to November 1987) are 
biased and can outperform random walk forecasts only marginally. 
Existing research suggests that variations in the monetary policy framework  can 
affect expectations of monetary phenomena.  For example, Ball (2000) considers the 
implications of alternative monetary regimes associated with different degrees of 
inflation persistence for inflation expectations (the period with no persistence, 1879 to 
1914, and the post-1960 period of persistent inflation). Although our sample period is 
relatively short, the monetary policy regime is not homogeneous but is characterised 
by significant institutional changes. The most important change is the adoption of the 
inflation targeting framework, which brings changes in the communications policy of 
the central bank and enhances the transparency of monetary policy.6 The enhanced 
transparency of inflation targeting has two dimensions. First the assignment of the 
central bank is cast in explicit terms. Second, monetary policy becomes more of an 
“economist’s job” rather than a “politician’s job” which means that the central bank 
needs to produce and disseminate relevant information (e.g., inflation report, forecasts 
and projections, statements, etc.). As in the UK the adoption of inflation targeting 
typically goes hand in hand with a central bank communication policy characterized 
by a high degree of transparency.  
An emerging question then is whether the degree of information released by the 
central bank to the public affects the functioning and efficiency of financial markets 
and their ability to process information. In this paper we consider whether the 
different institutional frameworks under which monetary policy operated in the UK 
affects the prevalence or violation of the rationality hypothesis.   
Some relevant recent evidence exists mainly for US interest rates where the move 
to a more transparent policy has been less discernible when compared to changes in 
the UK. For example, Lange et al. (2003) find that since the late 1980s the Treasury 
bill yield has been more successful in predicting changes in the federal funds rate. In a 
study of the US and six other industrialized countries Tomljanovich (2007) finds that 
                                                 
6 We also note the brief period of UK’s participation into the EMS since a fixed exchange rates system 
implies a high degree of transparency by itself (e.g., Herrendorf, 1999). 
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during the 1990s the forecast error for interest rates has decreased across maturities 
and that the expectations hypothesis performs better at the short end of the yield 
curve. Swanson’s (2006) results show that private sector forecasters’ ability to 
forecast the federal funds rate has improved and forecast uncertainty has decreased. 
This finding is valid even when one takes into account the decline in macroeconomic 
volatility.  
 
3. The data 
Consensus Economics has collected survey forecast data since October 1989.  Each 
month Consensus Economics contacts professional forecasters from the business and 
academic sectors asking for their end of month forecasts for a range of macro 
variables, including three-month inter-bank rates and ten-year gilt yields, for the three 
months and twelve months hence. For example, during the first week of January 
forecasters are asked for their predictions for the end of April and the end of the 
following January. Based on the combinations of maturities and forecast horizons, the 
forecasts of interest rates used in our study can be classified into four categories: 
SMSH (Short Maturity – Short Horizon); SMLH (Short Maturity – Long Horizon); 
LMSH (Long Maturity – Short Horizon) and LMLH (Long Maturity – Long 
Horizon). 
Our sample covers the period from October 1989 to July 2006.  In addition to an 
analysis of this full sample, we also study sub-periods that allow focusing on the 
different monetary policy regimes experienced in the UK during the last two decades.  
The three sub-periods correspond to the period of exchange rate targeting (1st October 
1989 – 15th September 1992); inflation targeting with interest rates set by the UK 
government (16th September 1992 – 5th May 1997); and inflation targeting with the 
Bank of England enjoying “economic independence” and interest rates set by the  
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) (6th May 1997 –31st July 2006). 
We include forecasters who provide at least 30 observations during the period in 
question. Based on this criterion, there are a total of 54 forecasters included in the 
whole sample period, with 20 forecasters in sub-period 1, 30 in sub-period 2 and 31 in 
sub-period 3 respectively. 
Our information set includes past forecast errors, past changes in spot rates, and 
the forward premium. Actual spot rate data of three-month inter-bank rates is obtained 
  9
from the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) while ten-year gilt yields are derived 
from Datastream Advance. The survey forecast horizon, however, does not 
correspond precisely with three month and twelve month horizons. To remedy for this 
inconsistency when constructing the forward premium we apply the widely-used 
cubic-spline technique to interpolate the non-standard interest rates on the basis of 
actual/365 day count convention. 
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) show that the expectations errors will be serially 
correlated when the forecast horizon is longer than the survey frequency. Since the 
actual forecast horizons of our survey data set are not exactly  months ( =3 or 12) 
but  months plus a few weeks, we assume a moving average process of order  for 
the monthly - month ahead expectations errors. This overlapping data problem is 
overcome by utilizing OLS estimates with Newey-West corrections for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, unless otherwise specified. 
k k
k k
k
 
4. Empirical results: heterogeneity and rationality 
4.1 Heterogeneity 
Table 1 reports a summary of the results for the heterogeneity tests as specified in 
equations (4) and (5).7 In each case, we report the number and percentage of 
forecasters whose forecasts are statistically different from the consensus forecasts.8 In 
other words, it is the number and percentage of rejections of the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity. The percentage of heterogeneous forecasts is at least as high as 50% in 
52 of the 56 cases reported in Table 1.  The rejection rate for the other 4 cases, all to 
be found in the sub-sample range of SMSH, is only marginally less than 50%.  
 
TABLE 1 around here 
 
To confirm that forecasts as a whole are heterogeneous, we use the binomial test 
suggested by McNees (1978). If individual regressions are assumed to be 
independent, each individual regression can be regarded as a trial with two mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive outcomes: rejection of the null hypothesis or failure to reject 
the null hypothesis. For our purposes, the probability of each outcome is 0.05 and 
                                                 
7 Throughout this paper, we only present a summary of results due to space limitations. The results of 
individual regressions can be requested from the authors. 
8 Unless otherwise specified, the level of significance is 5 percent throughout this paper. 
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0.95 respectively provided that the null hypothesis of individual regression is tested at 
5% level of significance. Under these assumptions we can apply binomial tests for 
each category of forecast to evaluate the null hypothesis that forecasts as a whole are 
homogeneous. We report the p-values of binomial tests in Table 1. For all cases, we 
find that the probability of the rejections occurring as a result of chance alone is less 
than 0.05 which leads us to conclude that heterogeneity exists in all cases. Therefore, 
the rationality test should be performed at the individual level in order to avoid the 
heterogeneity bias.   
 
4.2 Rationality 
The results of the test for unbiasedness, as defined in equation (6), are reported in 
Table 2. As with the heterogeneity tests, we perform binomial tests with the null 
hypothesis that forecasts as a whole are unbiased. The proportion of forecasters with 
biased forecasts, as signified by significant alphas, is significant at the 1% level for 
the whole sample for three of the four combinations of maturity and horizon and is 
significant at the 10% level (with a p-value of 0.052) for the remaining combination. 
It is noteworthy that the evidence of biased forecasts is generally more robust for the 
long horizon forecasts, with a significant number of forecasters demonstrating bias in 
five of the six sub-samples.  
 
TABLE 2 around here 
FIGURE 1 around here 
 
A closer analysis of the individual results reveals that across all combinations of 
maturities and forecast horizons the majority of forecasts underestimated the future 
spot rate.9 Of the 130 biased forecasts across all periods, 94% are associated with 
significantly negative alphas. The distribution of alphas reported in Figures 1 
illustrates this finding. The majority of alphas are negative and the distribution of 
alphas is apparently unimodal. As the forecast horizon increases, the distribution of 
alphas not only tends to move to the left and away from zero but its variance also 
becomes larger.  
                                                 
9 Earlier research (e.g., Theil 1966; Zarnowitz 1967, 1985; Stekler 1968, 1975; Smyth; 1981) finds that 
forecasters are likely to underestimate macroeconomic variables, such as GNP and inflation. One of the 
most likely explanations is that underestimation might be caused by the actual changes being more 
variable than the expected changes. 
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We provide the results of the orthogonality tests for informational efficiency in 
Table 3. Overall, we find substantially higher percentages of irrational forecasts for 
the orthogonality tests in comparison to the unbiasedness tests reported in Table 2. 
This evidence suggests that although some consensus forecasts are unbiased, they do 
not efficiently reflect publicly available information. Binomial tests indicate that the 
null hypothesis that forecasts as a whole are informational efficient is rejected for 38 
out of 40 cases. The orthogonality results reported in Table 3 represent a stronger 
rejection of the REH than the unbiasedness results reported in Table 2, implying that 
while a substantial number of forecasters were statistically unbiased, they were 
nevertheless informationally inefficient.   
 
TABLE 3 around here 
 
4.3 The degree of rationality across sub-periods, maturities and forecast 
horizons 
A visual inspection of Tables 2 and 3 suggests the degree of both the bias and 
orthogonality aspects of rationality varies across the sub-periods.  Broadly speaking, 
the number of forecasters revealed to be biased is at its lowest during sub-period 2 
while the results for sub-period 1 depends on whether the focus is on short forecast 
horizons, which are associated with low levels of bias, or long horizons, for which 
there is a substantially higher proportion of biased forecasts.10 To formally test 
whether the proportion of biased or non-orthogonal forecasts varies across all three 
sub-periods we present results of Fisher’s exact test based on 2 x 3 contingency 
tables.11  The results reported in the last column of Table 4 indicate that both 
measures of irrationality vary across time for SMLH, LMSH and LMLH, but not for 
SMSH. Turning to the tests for differences between individual periods, the first three 
columns in Table 4 report the percentage difference in rationality between each 
pairing of sub-periods along with the p-value from Fisher’s exact test for the 
corresponding 2 x 2 contingency table. We test the null hypothesis of equal 
percentage of forecasts violating the rationality assumption against the one-sided 
                                                 
10 All results for period 1 were re-estimated excluding outliers due to sterling’s exit from the ERM; 
subsequent results were qualitatively unchanged. 
11 Since some expected value of each cell in the contingency tables are less than 5, it is appropriate to 
use Fisher’s exact test, rather than a Chi-square test, when dealing with small samples. 
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alternative hypothesis. Although there are significant differences between each 
combination of sub-periods for SMLH, LMSH and LMLH, it is nevertheless difficult 
to discern a pattern. The findings are mixed and depend on the sub-periods, the 
maturities, the forecast horizons, and the type of rationality tested.  
While the bias tends to be lower in the second sub-period, table 4 does not support 
the presence of a clearcut overall pattern.  One would expect that the third (post 1997) 
sub-period should display a lower bias given the improved monetary policy 
communication framework in the context of inflation targeting. One possible 
explanation for our not finding a lower bias post-97 may be that other factors, in 
addition to and pre-dating the adoption of inflation targeting, underpin the apparent 
success of the expectations anchoring during the pre and post-97 period. Such an 
interpretation is consistent with recent empirical findings showing that while the 
adoption of inflation targeting is associated with low inflation, inflation had begun its 
downward trend well before the introduction of the given framework (Angeriz and 
Arestis, 2007, 2008). Of course this does not refute the contribution of inflation 
targeting in 'locking in' low inflation rates. 
TABLE 4 around here 
The results reported in Tables 2 and 3 also suggest that the degree to which the 
rationality assumption is violated varies across maturities and horizons. To find out 
the possible influence of these two dimensions on the degree of rationality, we again 
construct 2 x 2 contingency tables and apply Fisher’s exact test. Table 5 presents the 
percentage differences in the non-rational forecasts and p-values from Fisher’s exact 
test under the null hypothesis of equal percentage of the non-rational forecasts against 
the one-sided alternative hypothesis. In panels 1 and 2 of Table 5 we measure the 
effect of an increase in forecast horizon on the non-rationality of forecasts and in 
panels 3 and 4 we compare the degree of non-rationality of forecasts for long maturity 
interest rates in comparison to short maturity. The results for the whole period 
indicate that as both forecast horizons and interest maturities increase the level of 
irrationality increases. This finding is more pronounced in the orthogonality tests as 
compared to the unbiasedness tests. For the sub-periods, the majority of p-values 
indicate statistical significance, particularly for tests of orthogonality, suggesting that 
the degree of rationality is likely to depend on the horizon and maturity.  
 
TABLE 5 around here 
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 5. The impact of monetary policy implementation on the rational 
behaviour of forecasters 
The previous sections present persuasive evidence of changes in the level of 
rationality of forecasts across different monetary policy frameworks. It is, therefore, 
of interest to further explore whether the UK’s monetary policy implementation has 
any impact on the rationality of forecasts. To this end, we select three measures 
relating to the implementation of monetary policy: the announcement of a change in 
the bank rate, the publication of the inflation report, and the disagreement between 
members of the MPC.12  
Announcements of a change (or no change) in the bank rate constitute the actual 
monetary policy decisions. The inflation report and the publication of the MPC 
minutes (which records the dissenting votes) constitute aspects of the current inflation 
targeting framework. These features of the Bank of England’s institutional design are 
considered to enhance the transparency of monetary policy and facilitate central bank 
communication in order to anchor inflation expectations.    
The inflation report is published quarterly and provides a detailed economic 
analysis along with an assessment of the UK inflation prospects over a two-year 
horizon. It was first published in 1993 but has been published in its current form since 
1997. The analysis provided in the inflation report provides the rationale on which the 
MPC interest rate decisions are based. Moreover, its presentation is followed by a 
press conference where financial journalists have the opportunity to ask the Bank’s 
Governor13 thorny questions. Thus, the publication of the inflation report should have 
some information content for financial market participants.  
The minutes of the MPC have been published since 1997. They are published two 
weeks after the MPC meetings,14 this being a relatively short period of delay as 
compared to the practice of other central banks. The issue of whether the publication 
of voting records makes monetary policy more transparent has been the subject of 
some debate, especially in the context of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) 
                                                 
12 Since the results of the orthogonality condition of rationality might be varied by the selected 
common information set, we only focus on the unbiasedness condition of rationality in this section. 
Therefore, the term rationality in this section refers to the unbiasedness dimension and not to the 
orthogonality dimension. 
13 In the past the Deputy Governor has played this role.  
14 More specifically, the minutes are published on the Wednesday of the second week after the 
meetings take place. This practice has been adopted since 1998. 
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institutional design.15 For the UK, Gerlach-Kristen (2004) finds that the publication of 
the MPC’s voting records can help forecast future policy changes but this information 
does not appear to be used by market participants when they form their expectations 
of future changes to interest rates. 
Table 6 presents the results of the effect of the monetary policy signal on the 
unbiasedness condition of rationality. We report the results for the number of 
forecasters providing biased forecasts for each combination of maturity and horizon 
according to whether the forecast was made in the absence of a policy signal (group 
1) or following a signal (group 2). The signal takes the form of: a change in bank 
rates; the publication of the inflation report; or disagreement reported in the MPC 
minutes, occurring during the month prior to the survey date.   
 
TABLE 6 around here 
 
First, we examine the effect of monthly changes in official bank rates on the 
biasedness of forecasts.  For short maturity, short horizon forecasts there is an 
insignificant reduction in the proportion of forecasts that are biased, from six (11.1%) 
in group 1 to five (9.3%) in group 2.  For all other combinations of maturity and 
forecast horizon the signal of a change in the bank rate is associated with a significant 
reduction in the percentage of forecasters whose forecasts are biased. This finding is 
quite intuitive because the timing and magnitude of changes to official bank rates 
influences both longer maturity rates and future short and long term rates, as financial 
market participants adjust their expectations. 
Second, we investigate whether the publication of inflation reports are associated 
with a reduction of the number of biased forecasts. The results presented in Table 6 
suggest that the publication of the inflation report does not help reduce the biasedness 
of forecasts. At first glance, this finding may be surprising since the inflation report is 
regarded as an example of good practice in central bank communication (Blinder 
2004; Blinder et al. 2008). Financial market participants generally pore over the Bank 
of England’s inflation reports since they provide useful insights to the bank’s thinking 
and hints on the likely direction of interest rates. A probable explanation for our 
counter-intuitive finding is that most information in the inflation report is already 
                                                 
15 See Buiter (1999) and Issing (1999) for two conflicting views on this issue. 
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absorbed by market participants prior to its quarterly publication. The interest rate 
decision usually takes place within less than two weeks before the publication of the 
inflation report and it may be that financial market participants extract limited 
information content at the margin. Moreover, they can get similar information from 
the minutes of MPC monthly meetings or from other sources during the quarter. 
Lastly, we explore the effect of the disagreement between members of the MPC at 
each MPC monthly meeting.16 The evidence presented in Table 6 exhibits a similar 
pattern to the impact of official bank rate changes. Disagreement amongst the MPC is 
associated with a significant reduction in the level of biasedness of forecasts for long 
maturity rates over both short and long forecast horizons. For short maturity interest 
rates, voting disagreement within the MPC does not impact on the biasedness of 
forecasts at the short horizon whereas forecasts over the long horizon are less biased 
when there is discord within the MPC.  
These findings may appear to be counter intuitive. If disagreement amongst the 
MPC is considered to be a measure of uncertainty of the direction of future monetary 
policy, the level of unbiasedness of forecasts may be expected to decrease. However, 
as Blinder (2004) notes, while on the one hand the individualistic nature of the Bank 
of England’s MPC with its occasionally “fractious” post-meeting statements may give 
rise to uncertainty, on the other hand, the announcement of the committee’s vote does 
convey real information. Indeed, a possible explanation for our results is that 
disagreement within the MPC tends to precede a change in rates and hence gives 
some helpful hints of the future course of interest rates so the forecasts is less biased 
when there is the disagreement between the MPC. 
In conclusion, our evidence indicates that the disagreement and changes in the 
official bank rate, but not the publication of inflation report, assist market participants 
to produce less biased forecasts for ten year rates over the short term forecast horizon 
and for both three month and ten year rates over the longer forecast horizon. But none 
of our monetary policy signals has a significant influence on the biasedness of 
forecasts for the three month rate over the short forecast horizon. 
 
6. Conclusion 
                                                 
16During our sample period, there are 65 out of 108 MPC meetings in which at least one member votes 
for the higher or lower official bank rate. 
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We explore the heterogeneity and rationality of forecasts of the three-month inter-
bank rate and the ten-year gilt yield over three and twelve-month forecast horizons, 
focusing on the behaviour of individual forecasters.  We investigate the unbiasedness 
and orthogonality conditions of the REH over the period 1989-2006 as well as 
specific sub-periods corresponding to different monetary policy frameworks. We 
consider the implications of changes in the transparency of the monetary policy on the 
unbiasedness of expectations. 
Our main findings can be summarised as follows: First, conducting the 
heterogeneity test as a pre-test of the REH, we find there exists significant variation 
across individual forecasts resulting from both individual and idiosyncratic effects. 
The most important implication of this finding is that the test for the REH should be 
performed at the individual level in order to avoid aggregation and heterogeneity 
biases. Second, the univariate tests for unbiasedness reveal that forecasts as a whole 
are biased and the degree of bias increases as the forecast horizon or maturity 
increases with forecasts tending to underestimate the future spot rate. Third, we 
investigate the orthogonality condition of rationality with reference to the different 
information sets. The findings from the orthogonality tests vary depending on the 
selected information set. Both unbiasedness and orthogonality conditions provide 
fairly consistent results even though the evidence of rationality from the unbiasedness 
test is not as strong as that from the orthogonality test. Fourth, changes in the official 
bank rate and the MPC’s disagreement, as reflected in the MPC voting record, 
significantly reduces the number of unbiased forecasts in SMLH, LMSH and LMLH, 
but not SMSH. The publication of the inflation report, however, does not help 
improve the unbiasedness in any case. Finally, there is convincing evidence that the 
rationality of forecasts displays differences over different monetary policy 
frameworks. 
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Table 1  Summary of the heterogeneity tests  
 
SH (Short horizon) LH (Long horizon) 
  
Sub-
period 1 
Sub-
period 2 
Sub-
period 3 
Whole 
period 
Sub-
period 1 
Sub-
period 2 
Sub-
period 3 
Whole 
period 
Total No. of forecasters 20 30 31 54 20 30 31 54 
 
Panel 1 : SM (Short maturity)                                                   SMSH                                                                      SMLH 
 Individual effect                 
No. of heterogeneous forecasts 9 15 13 27 11 24 21 35 
(Percentage) (45.00%) (50.00%) (41.49%) (50.00%) (55.00%) (80.00%) (67.74%) (64.81%) 
p-value 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Individual & idiosyncratic effect                 
    Forward premium         
No. of heterogeneous forecasts 11 15 18 33 Na Na Na Na 
(Percentage) (55.00%) (50.00%) (58.06%) (61.11%) (Na) (Na) (Na) (Na) 
p-value 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** Na Na Na Na 
    Lagged spot rate change         
No. of heterogeneous forecasts 9 15 15 34 11 23 26 44 
(Percentage) (45.00%) (50.00%) (48.39%) (62.96%) (55.00%) (76.67%) (83.87%) (81.48%) 
p-value 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
    Lagged consensus forecast error         
No. of heterogeneous forecasts 15 22 24 46 17 29 31 52 
(Percentage) (75.00%) (73.33%) (77.42%) (85.19%) (85.00%) (96.67%) (100.00%) (96.30%) 
p-value 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 
Panel 2 : LM (Long maturity)                                                    LMSH                                                                      LMLH 
 Individual effect                 
No. of heterogeneous forecasts 13 15 17 31 10 16 18 31 
(Percentage) (65.00%) (50.00%) (54.84%) (57.41%) (50.00%) (53.33%) (58.06%) (57.41%) 
p-value 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Individual & idiosyncratic effect                 
    Forward premium         
No. of heterogeneous forecasts 13 18 22 40 Na Na Na Na 
(Percentage) (65.00%) (60.00%) (70.97%) (74.07%) (Na) (Na) (Na) (Na) 
p-value 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** Na Na Na Na 
    Lagged spot rate change         
No. of heterogeneous forecasts 12 17 18 34 10 16 18 33 
(Percentage) (60.00%) (56.67%) (58.06%) (62.96%) (50.00%) (53.33%) (58.06%) (61.11%) 
p-value 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
    Lagged consensus forecast error         
No. of heterogeneous forecasts 15 22 28 49 16 30 30 52 
(Percentage) (75.00%) (73.33%) (90.32%) (90.74%) (80.00%) (100.00%) (96.77%) (96.30%) 
p-value 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 
Notes: The range of each period is as follows: whole period (1/10/1989 –  31/07/2006), sub-period 1 (1/10/1989 – 
15/09/1992), sub-period 2 (16/09/1992 – 5/05/1997), sub-period 3 (6/05/1997 – 31/07/2007). The p-value is for the 
binomial test under the null hypothesis that forecasts as a whole are homogeneous. ** and * signify statistical significance 
at 5 and 10 percent respectively. Due to the limit to maturity of the yield curve, we do not compute the forward premium at 
the long forecast horizon. Thus, “Na” indicates that the relevant test cannot be performed since the information set is 
unavailable.                                                
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Table 2  Summary results on the unbiasedness condition of rationality 
 
SH (Short horizon) LH (Long horizon) 
  
Sub-
period 1 
Sub-
period 2 
Sub-
period 3 
Whole 
period 
Sub-
period 1 
Sub-
period 2 
Sub-
period 3 
Whole 
period 
Total No. of forecasters 20 30 31 54 20 30 31 54 
 
Panel 1 : SM (Short maturity)                                           SMSH                                                                            SMLH 
No. of biased forecasts 1 2 5 6 11 4 5 12 
(Percentage) (5.00%) (6.67%) (16.13%) (11.11%) (55.00%) (13.33%) (16.13%) (22.22%) 
p-value 0.642 0.446 0.018** 0.052* 0.000** 0.061* 0.018** 0.000** 
         
No. of underestimating  20 5 18 36 20 20 23 45 
forecasts         
(Percentage) (100.00%) (16.67%) (58.06%) (66.67%) (100.00%) (66.67%) (74.19%) (83.33%) 
p-value 0.642 0.446 0.018** 0.052* 0.000** 0.061* 0.018** 0.000** 
         
No. of Significant  1 0 3 3 11 3 5 12 
underestimating forecasts         
(Percentage) (100.00%) (0.00%) (60.00%) (50.00%) (100.00%) (75.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) 
         
 
Panel 2 : LM (Long maturity)                                            LMSH                                                                            LMLH 
No. of biased forecasts 2 2 12 13 16 3 15 21 
(Percentage) (10.00%) (6.67%) (38.71%) (24.07%) (80.00%) (10.00%) (48.39%) (38.89%) 
p-value 0.264 0.446 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.188 0.000** 0.000** 
         
No. of underestimating  17 21 30 47 20 28 28 50 
forecasts         
(Percentage) (85.00%) (70.00%) (96.77%) (87.04%) (100.00%) (93.33%) (90.32%) (92.59%) 
         
No. of significant 
underestimating forecasts 2 2 12 13 16 3 15 21 
(Percentage) (100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) 
         
 
Notes: The range of each period is as follows: whole period (1/10/1989 –  31/07/2006), sub-period 1 (1/10/1989 – 
15/09/1992), sub-period 2 (16/09/1992 – 5/05/1997), sub-period 3 (6/05/1997 – 31/07/2007). The p-value is for the binomial 
test provided that the null hypothesis of individual regression is tested at 5% significance level. The null hypothesis of 
binomial test is that forecasts as a whole are unbiasedness. ** and * signify statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent 
respectively. In each panel, the percentage of significant underestimating forecasts is calculated with respect to the number 
of biased forecasts.  
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Table 3  Summary results on the orthogonality condition of rationality 
 
SH( Short horizon) LM (Long horizon) 
  
Sub-
period 1 
Sub-
period 2 
Sub-
period 3 
Whole 
period 
Sub-
period 1 
Sub-
period 2 
Sub-
period 3 
Whole 
period 
Total No. of forecasters 20 30 31 54 20 30 31 54 
 
Panel 1 : SM (Short maturity)                                         SMSH                                                                    SMLH 
 Forward premium         
No. of inefficient forecasts 3 8 13 25 Na Na Na Na 
(Percentage) (15.00%) (26.67%) (41.94%) (46.30%) (Na) (Na) (Na) (Na) 
p-value 0.075* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** Na Na Na Na 
Lagged spot rate change         
No. of inefficient forecasts 3 12 6 10 11 29 11 23 
(Percentage) (15.00%) (40.00%) (19.35%) (18.52%) (55.00%) (96.67%) (35.48%) (42.59%) 
p-value 0.075* 0.000** 0.004** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Lagged forecast error         
No. of inefficient forecasts 1 7 7 14 10 28 14 24 
(Percentage) (5.00%) (23.33%) (22.58%) (25.30%) (50.00%) (93.33%) (45.16%) (44.44%) 
p-value 0.642 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 
Panel 2 : LM (Long Maturity)                                          LMSH                                                                      LMLH 
 Forward premium         
No. of inefficient forecasts 6 2 15 17 Na Na Na Na 
(Percentage) (30.00%) (6.67%) (48.39%) (31.48%) (Na) (Na) (Na) (Na) 
p-value 0.000** 0.446 0.000** 0.000** Na Na Na Na 
Lagged spot rate change         
No. of inefficient forecasts 18 4 13 20 19 20 27 41 
(Percentage) (90.00%) (13.33%) (41.94%) (37.04%) (95.00%) (66.67%) (87.10%) (75.93%) 
p-value 0.000** 0.061* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Lagged forecast error         
No. of inefficient forecasts 10 6 11 22 19 21 26 45 
(Percentage) (50.00%) (20.00%) (35.48%) (40.74%) (95.00%) (70.00%) (83.87%) (83.33%) 
p-value 0.000** 0.003** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 
Notes: The range of each period is as follows: whole period (1/10/1989 –  31/07/2006), sub-period 1 (1/10/1989 – 
15/09/1992), sub-period 2 (16/09/1992 – 5/05/1997), sub-period 3 (6/05/1997 – 31/07/2007). The p-value is for the 
binomial test provided that the null hypothesis of individual regression is tested at 5% significance level. The null 
hypothesis of binomial test is that forecasts as a whole are informational efficiency. ** and * signify statistical 
significance at 5 and 10 percent respectively. Due to the limit to maturity of the yield curve, we do not compute the 
forward premium at the long forecast horizon. Thus, “Na” indicates that the relevant test cannot be performed since 
the information set is unavailable. 
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Table 4  The difference in irrational forecasts between sub-periods 
 
Panel 
Maturity 
& 
horizon Type of rationality test 
Sub-period 2 
- 
Sub-period 1 
Sub-period 3 
- 
Sub-period 2 
Sub-period 3 
- 
Sub-period 1 
Among  
all 
sub-periods 
1 SMSH Unbiasedness condition +1.67% +9.46% +11.13%  
  p-value 0.651 0.226 0.230 0.444 
  Orthogonality condition     
     Forward premium +11.67% +15.27% +26.94%  
   p-value 0.269 0.162 0.041** 0.122 
     Lagged spot rate change +25.00% -20.65% +4.35%  
  p-value 0.055* 0.068* 0.499 0.098* 
     Lagged individual forecast error +18.33% -0.75% +17.58%  
  p-value 0.087* 0.592 0.095* 0.207 
2 SMLH Unbiasedness condition -41.67% +2.80% -38.87%  
  p-value 0.002** 0.522 0.005** 0.003** 
  Orthogonality condition     
     Forward premium Na Na Na  
   p-value Na Na Na Na 
     Lagged spot rate change +41.67% -61.18% -19.52%  
  p-value 0.001** 0.000** 0.139 0.000** 
     Lagged individual forecast error +43.33% -48.17% -4.84%  
  p-value 0.001** 0.000** 0.479 0.000** 
3 LMSH Unbiasedness condition -3.33% +32.04% +28.71%  
  p-value 0.528 0.003** 0.024** 0.004** 
  Orthogonality condition     
     Forward premium -23.33% +41.72% +18.39%  
   p-value 0.036** 0.000** 0.156 0.001** 
     Lagged spot rate change -76.67% +28.60% -48.06%  
  p-value 0.000** 0.013** 0.001** 0.000** 
     Lagged individual forecast error -30.00% +15.48% -14.52%  
  p-value 0.028** 0.144 0.230 0.087* 
4 LMLH Unbiasedness condition -70.00% +38.39% -31.61%  
  p-value 0.000** 0.001** 0.023** 0.000** 
  Orthogonality condition     
     Forward premium Na Na Na  
   p-value Na Na Na Na 
     Lagged spot rate change -28.33% +20.43% -7.90%  
  p-value 0.018** 0.055* 0.340 0.032** 
     Lagged individual forecast error -25.00% +13.87% -11.13%  
  p-value 0.031** 0.163 0.230 0.081* 
 
Notes: The p-value is for Fisher’s exact test. ** and * signify statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent 
significance level respectively. The p-value in last column is for Fisher’s exact test of 2 x 3 contingency table 
based on the null hypothesis that the percentage of irrational forecasts among three sub-period is indifferent. The 
alternative hypothesis is that there is at least one sub-period in which its percentage of irrational forecasts is 
different from any other sub-period. The p-value in the first three column is for Fisher’s exact test of 2 x 2 
consistency table based on the null hypothesis of no difference in the percentage of irrational forecasts between 
two sub-periods. The null hypothesis is tested against one-sided alternative hypothesis. The positive (negative) 
difference in percentage implies that the percentage of irrational forecasts at the later sub-period is greater (less) 
than that at the previous sub-period. For example, the positive (negative) sign in the first column means that the 
percentage of irrational forecasts in sub-period 2 is greater (less than) than that in sub-period 1. Due to the limit 
to maturity of the yield curve, we do not compute the forward premium at the long forecast horizon. Thus, “Na” 
indicates that the relevant test cannot be performed since the information set is unavailable. 
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Table 5  Effect of maturity and horizon on rationality 
 
Panel Description Type of rationality test 
Sub-
period 1 
Sub-
period 2 
Sub-
period 3 
Whole 
period 
1 The Difference in Unbiasedness +50.00% +6.67% 0.00% +11.11% 
 irrational forecasts of p-value 0.001** 0.335 0.634 0.098* 
 SMLH relative to SMSH Orthogonality    Lagged spot rate change +40.00% +56.67% +16.13% +24.07% 
  p-value 0.009** 0.000** 0.127 0.006** 
     Lagged individual forecast error +45.00% +70.00% +22.58% +18.52% 
  p-value 0.002** 0.000** 0.053* 0.035** 
2 The Difference in Unbiasedness +70.00% +3.33% +9.68% +14.81% 
 irrational forecasts of p-value 0.000** 0.681 0.304 0.073* 
 LMLH relative to LMSH Orthogonality    Lagged spot rate change +5.00% +53.33% +45.16% +38.89% 
  p-value 0.500 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
     Lagged individual forecast error +45.00% +50.00% +48.39% +42.59% 
  p-value 0.002** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
3 The Difference in Unbiasedness +5.00% 0.00% +22.58% +12.96% 
 irrational forecasts of p-value 0.500 0.694 0.043** 0.064* 
 LMSH relative to SMSH Orthogonality    Lagged spot rate change +75.00% -26.67% +22.58% +18.52% 
  p-value 0.002** 0.020** 0.049** 0.026** 
     Lagged individual forecast error +45.00% -3.33% +12.90% +14.81% 
  p-value 0.002** 0.500 0.201 0.076* 
4 The Difference in Unbiasedness +25.00% -3.33% +32.26% +16.67% 
 irrational forecasts of p-value 0.088* 0.500 0.007** 0.052* 
 LMLH relative to SMLH Orthogonality    Lagged spot rate change +40.00% -30.00% +51.61% +33.33% 
  p-value 0.004** 0.003** 0.000** 0.000** 
     Lagged individual forecast error +45.00% -23.33% +38.71% +38.89% 
  p-value 0.002** 0.021** 0.002** 0.000** 
 
Notes: The range of each period is as follows: whole period (1/10/1989 –  31/07/2006), sub-period 1 (1/10/1989 – 
15/09/1992), sub-period 2 (16/09/1992 – 5/05/1997), sub-period 3 (6/05/1997 – 31/07/2007). The p-value is for 
Fisher’s exact test. For panels 1 and 2, the null hypothesis is that the increase in forecast horizon has no impact on the 
number of irrational forecasts. For panels 3 and 4, the null hypothesis is that the increase in maturity has no impact on 
the number of irrational forecasts. The null hypothesis is tested against one-sided alternative hypothesis.. ** and * 
signify statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent respectively. The positive (negative) percentage difference implies 
that the percentage of irrational forecasts increases (decreases) when the forecast horizon increases in panels 1 and 2 
or when the maturity increases in panels 3 and 4.  
Table 6  Summary of the effect of monetary policy signals on the unbiasedness 
condition of rationality 
 
Monetary policy signals 
 
SH (Short horizon) 
 
LH (Long horizon) 
 
 
Group 1 
 
Group 2 
 
Difference 
 
Group 1 
 
Group 2 
 
Difference 
 
Panel 1 : SM (Short maturity)                                         SMSH                                                    SMLH 
Official bank rate change       
No. of biased forecasts 6 5 -1 16 5 -11 
(Percentage) (11.11%) (9.26%) (-1.85%) (29.63%) (9.26%) (-20.37%) 
p-value 0.052* 0.132 0.500 0.000** 0.132 0.007** 
Publication of the  inflation report       
No. of biased forecasts 7 12 +5 2 7 +5 
(Percentage) (14.89%) (25.53%) (+10.64%) (4.25%) (14.89%) (+10.64%) 
p-value 0.008** 0.000** 0.152 0.688 0.008** 0.079* 
Disagreement amongst MPC       
No. of biased forecasts 3 3 0 13 3 -10 
(Percentage) (9.68%) (9.68%) (0.00%) (41.94%) (9.68%) (-32.26%) 
p-value 0.201 0.201 0.664 0.000** 0.201 0.004** 
 
Panel 2 : LM (Long maturity)                                          LMSH                                                    LMLH 
Official bank rate change       
No. of biased forecasts 14 3 -11 20 11 -9 
(Percentage) (25.93%) (5.56%) (-20.37%) (37.04%) (20.37%) (-16.67%) 
p-value 0.000** 0.511 0.003** 0.000** 0.000** 0.044** 
Publication of the  inflation report       
No. of biased forecasts 10 5 -5 14 12 -2 
(Percentage) (21.28%) (10.64%) (-10.64%) (29.79%) (25.53%) (-4.26%) 
p-value 0.000** 0.085* 0.130 0.000** 0.000** 0.409 
Disagreement amongst MPC       
No. of biased forecasts 23 3 -20 24 9 -15 
(Percentage) (74.19%) (9.68%) (-64.51%) (77.42%) (29.03%) (-48.39%) 
p-value 0.000** 0.201 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 
Notes: The p-value in column named “Group 1” and “Group 2” is for the binomial test provided that the 
null hypothesis of individual regression is tested at 5% significance level. The null hypothesis of 
binomial test is that forecasts as a whole are unbiasedness. The p-value in column named “Difference” is 
for Fisher’s exact test under the null hypothesis of no difference in the number of irrational forecasts 
between two groups. The null hypothesis is tested against one-sided alternative hypothesis.  ** and * 
signify statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent respectively. The study period and the number of 
forecasters for each test of monetary policy signal are as follows: the disagreement amongst the MPC: 
August 1997 – July 2006 (31 forecasters),  the Publication of the inflation report: Jan 1993 – July 2006 
(47 forecasters), the announcement of a change in bank rate: October 1989 – July 2006 (54 forecasters). 
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Figure 1  The distribution of bias coefficient 
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                                                                               Significant at 5% level                             Insignificant at 5% level 
 
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of alphas estimated by equation (6). 
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